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Abstract
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such
games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, know-
ing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all
actions chosen during the game. We define and examine the new condition of individual
upper semicontinuity on the payoff functions, which is weaker than upper semicontinuity. We
prove that a game with individual upper semicontinuous payoff functions admits a subgame
perfect -equilibrium for every  > 0, in eventually pure strategy profiles.
Keywords: Almost perfect information, subgame perfect -equilibrium, individual upper semi-
continuity.
JEL: C62, C65, C72, C73.
1 Introduction
Games with almost perfect information play a prominent role in the theory of dynamic games. In
these games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions, knowing the actions chosen
at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is determined by the sequence of actions that have
been chosen during the entire game. The notion of subgame perfect equilibrium and the weaker
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notion of subgame perfect -equilibrium, where  > 0 is an error term, are two main solution
concepts in these games. We continue the discussion of these games under the assumptions that
the number of players is finite and the payoffs are bounded.
A major body of the literature on games with almost perfect information examines the existence
of subgame perfect equilibrium while assuming some kind of continuity of the payoff functions
and compactness of the action spaces. Fudenberg and Levine (1983) showed that if the payoff
functions are continuous and the action spaces are finite, then there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium. With infinite but compact action spaces the existence question becomes very subtle,
see for instance Harris, Reny and Robson (1995), Mertens and Parthasarathy (2003), or Maitra and
Sudderth (2007). For a detailed overview, we refer the reader to the recent survey by Jas´kiewicz
and Nowak (2016).
In this paper we continue the investigation of the existence of subgame perfect -equilibria in
games with almost perfect information. We assume that the set of available actions is finite. The
sequence of actions chosen in the game is referred to as a play. The contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, we introduce a new condition, called individual upper semicontinuity, on the payoff
functions. Individual upper semicontinuity is reminiscent of upper semicontinuity, but it uses a
new notion of convergence on the set of plays for each player separately.
Consider a player i. We say that a sequence of plays (pm)m∈N is i-convergent to a play p if (1)
the length of the common history between the play pm and p tends to infinity, and (2) for large
m ∈ N, either pm = p or the first deviation from p to pm involves only player i. This notion of
convergence of plays is stronger than the conventional notion, which would only require property
(1). That is, each i-convergent sequence of plays is also convergent in the conventional sense, but
not vice versa. Based on the notion of i-convergence, we say that the payoff function of player i is
i-upper semicontinuous if for each sequence of plays (pm)m∈N that is i-convergent to a play p, player
i weakly prefers the payoff along p compared to the payoff along pm for large m. If player i’s payoff
function is upper semicontinuous in the conventional sense, then it is also i-upper semicontinuous,
but not vice versa. We analyze the topological properties of i-convergence and the properties of
i-upper semicontinuous payoff functions in detail.
Secondly, we show that if each player i’s payoff function is i-upper semicontinuous, then the
game admits a subgame perfect -equilibrium for every  > 0. Moreover, these strategy profiles are
eventually pure, meaning that in each subgame randomization is only used at finitely many stages
with probability 1. The proof of our existence result is constructive. The key idea is that if each
player i’s payoff function is i-upper semicontinuous, then each play eventually reaches a history
after which no player has an incentive to deviate from this play. This enables us to essentially cut
the time horizon of the game at some finite stages and to apply backward induction on the earlier
stages. This existence result generalizes the result of Purves and Sudderth (2011), who study
perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoff functions, in two directions. We
reduce the topological restrictions on the payoff functions of the players and we allow the players
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to move simultaneously.1 In normal form games with totally ordered compact strategy spaces,
Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) show that it is possible to ensure the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium, while significantly relaxing the requirements relating to the upper semicontinuity and
single crossing properties of the payoff functions.
Games with perfect information are an important special case of games with almost perfect
information. Conditions related to semicontinuity of the payoff functions play an important role
in several results for perfect information games. Not only do perfect information games where
every player has an upper semicontinuous payoff function admit a subgame perfect -equilibrium
for every  > 0 (Purves and Sudderth, 2011), so do perfect information games where every player
has a lower semicontinuous payoff function as proven in Flesch et al. (2010). Moreover, these
results were extended and unified in Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016). Questions related to semi-
continuity are also studied in Le Roux and Pauly (2016) and Bruye`re, Le Roux, Pauly and Raskin
(2017). A counterexample by Flesch et al. (2014) shows that perfect information games with finite
action sets and Borel measurable payoff functions do not always have subgame perfect -equilibria.
This further illustrates the importance of topological properties of payoff functions in equilibrium
analysis. For an overview on subgame perfect -equilibria in perfect information games, we refer
to Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2016) and Bruye`re (2017). We remark that it follows from a result of
Secchi and Sudderth (2001) that if the players have upper semicontinuous payoff functions in a
stochastic game with a countable state space, then the game admits a Nash -equilibrium for every
 > 0.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
introduce the notions of i-convergence for plays and i-upper semicontinuity for payoff functions of
player i. In Section 3, we present four illustrating examples. In Section 4, we prove the above-
mentioned existence result for subgame perfect -equilibria. In Section 5, we study the topology
induced by i-convergence in detail. Finally, in Section 6, we provide some concluding remarks.
2 The model
In this section we describe the model and define the notion of individual upper semicontinuity of
payoff functions. Let N = {1, 2, . . .} and N∗ = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
The game: We consider games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. We
assume that the set of players and the sets of available actions are finite. Such a game is given by
a tuple G = {I, (Ai)i∈I , H, (ui)i∈I}, where
1. I is a non-empty and finite set of players.
2. For each player i ∈ I, Ai is a non-empty finite set of actions. Let A = ×i∈IAi. The set A
corresponds to the set of stage game outcomes.
1Purves and Sudderth (2011) allow arbitrary action sets in perfect information games. In Section 6 we argue
that for perfect information games, we can dispense with the assumption that the action sets are finite.
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3. H ⊆ ∪t∈N∗At is a non-empty set of histories, where A0 is the singleton {ø}. At each history
h ∈ H, let A(h) = {a ∈ A|ha ∈ H} and for each player i ∈ I let Ai(h) denote the projection
of A(h) on Ai. The set A(h) corresponds to the set of stage game outcomes at history h and
Ai(h) to the set of available actions for player i at history h. We assume that: (i) H is closed
under initial segments: if for some t ∈ N∗ and ha ∈ At+1 we have ha ∈ H, then we also have
h ∈ H, (ii) for each history h ∈ H and each player i ∈ I, the set Ai(h) is non-empty, (iii)
the set of stage game outcomes at history h is a product set: for each h ∈ H it holds that
A(h) = ×i∈IAi(h).
4. Let P denote the set of all sequences (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN such that for every t ∈ N we have
(a1, . . . , at) ∈ H. The set P is called the set of plays.2 For each i ∈ I, ui : P → R is the
payoff function of player i.
The game is played at stages in N. At stage 1, each player i ∈ I chooses an action a1i from the
set Ai(ø), independently of the other players. This yields a stage game outcome a
1 = (a1i )i∈I . At
a general stage t ∈ N, knowing the previous stage game outcomes a1, . . . , at−1, each player i ∈ I
chooses an action ati from the set Ai(a
1, . . . , at−1), independently of the other players. This yields
a stage game outcome at = (ati)i∈I . The payoff of each player i ∈ I is given by ui(a1, a2, . . .).
Notations for histories and plays: For every t ∈ N∗, for every history h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ H,
let ‖h‖ = t denote the number of stage games played during h. We refer to ‖h‖ as the length of
history h. For k ∈ N∗ such that k ≤ t, let h|k = (a1, . . . , ak) denote the truncated history available
after stage game k. If h, h′ ∈ H are such that there exists t ∈ N∗ for which h′|t = h, then h is called
an initial segment of h′, denoted by h  h′. We write h ≺ h′ if h  h′ and h 6= h′. Furthermore if
h  h′ then we can define the maximum of these histories as max(h, h′) = h′ and the minimum of
these histories as min(h, h′) = h.
For every t ∈ N∗, let p|t denote the history that arises by restricting p to the first t stages. Let
p[t],i = a
t
i denote the action that player i played at stage t along the play p. For a history h ∈ H and
a play p ∈ P we write h ≺ p if p is an extension of h, i.e. for some t ∈ N∗ we have p|t = h. We call h
a prefix of p. For any two distinct plays p, q ∈ P , let min(p, q) denote the longest common history
shared by those plays and let `(p, q) denote its length. Furthermore, define min(p, p) = p and
`(p, p) = ∞. For any two distinct plays p, q ∈ P , let I(p, q) ⊆ I denote the subset of players who
deviated first from the play p to the play q, i.e. if `(p, q) = t then I(p, q) = {i ∈ I|p[t+1],i 6= q[t+1],i}.
We formally define I(p, p) = ∅. Note that I, `, and min are all symmetric in their two arguments.
Strategies: A mixed action for player i ∈ I at history h ∈ H is a probability measure on Ai(h).
A strategy for player i ∈ I is a mapping σi that assigns to each history h ∈ H a mixed action σi(h)
for player i at history h. Let Si denote the set of all strategies of player i. If for every history
h ∈ H the mixed action σi(h) places probability 1 on one action, then σi is called a pure strategy.
2Properties (3.i) and (3.ii) mean that H is a a pruned tree on A. Thus, P can be seen as the set of all infinite
branches of H.
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A tuple of strategies σ = (σi)i∈I is called a strategy profile. The set of strategy profiles is
denoted by S = ×i∈ISi. For each player i ∈ I, let σ−i = (σj)j∈I\{i} denote the profile of strategies
of player i’s opponents. The strategy profile σ is called pure if each player i’s strategy σi is pure.
A pure strategy profile σ ∈ S induces a unique play from every history h, which we denote by
pi(σ;h). For a general strategy profile σ ∈ S, let Hσ denote the set of histories h with the following
property: there is a play p = (h, a`(h)+1, a`(h)+2, . . .) such that for each each stage k ≥ `(h) and
for each player i ∈ I, the mixed action σi(h, a`(h)+1, . . . , ak) places probability 1 on action ak+1i .
Intuitively, this means that at history h, the strategy profile σ induces the play p with probability
1. The strategy profile σ is called eventually pure in every subgame if for each history h ∈ H and
each play p  h there is a history h′ such that h  h′ ≺ p and h′ ∈ Hσ. This means that starting
at any history, any continuation play reaches a history after which the strategy profile σ induces
a unique play.
Topology on the set of plays: We now define the standard cylinder topology on the set
of plays P .3 For each history h ∈ H, let P (h) denote the set of all plays extending h, i.e.
P (h) = {p ∈ P |p  h}. Let T denote the topology on the set of plays P induced by the collection
{P (h)|h ∈ H}. It is easy to see that the collection {P (h)|h ∈ H} forms a basis of the topology
T . That is, for a set Q ⊆ P , we have Q ∈ T exactly when Q can be written as a union of sets
belonging to {P (h)|h ∈ H}. The topological space (P, T ) is metrizable. For example, the metric
d : P × P → [0,∞) defined by d(p, q) = 2−`(p,q) induces the topology T . Moreover, T coincides
with the relative topology inherited from the product topology on AN. Since the latter space is
compact and P is a closed subset of it, we conclude that (P, T ) is compact.
Let Σ denote the Borel sigma-algebra corresponding to the topology T . Then, (P,Σ) is a
measurable space. Similarly, for every history h ∈ H, we can construct the measurable space
(P (h),Σh), where Σh is the sigma-algebra generated by all sets P (h
′) with h′  h. We have
Σh = {Q ∩ P (h)|Q ∈ Σ}.
As a consequence of the Ionescu Tulcea extension theorem, every strategy profile σ ∈ S induces
for every history h ∈ H a probability measure Ph,σ on the measurable space (P (h),Σh). Note that
σ is pure exactly when for each history h ∈ H, Ph,σ is a Dirac measure. Also, σ is eventually pure
in every subgame exactly when for each history h ∈ H and each play p  h there exists a history
h′ such that h  h′ ≺ p and Ph′,σ is a Dirac measure.
Convergence and upper semicontinuity: In the topology T , a sequence of plays (pm)m∈N is
convergent to the play p if lim
m→∞
`(pm, p) = ∞. The payoff function ui of player i is called upper
semicontinuous if for each play p ∈ P and each sequence (pm)m∈N that is convergent to p, we have
lim sup
m→∞
ui(pm) ≤ ui(p). If ui is upper semicontinuous, then it is also Borel measurable.
We now strengthen the notion of convergence. Consider a player i ∈ I. We say that a sequence
of plays (pm)m∈N is i-convergent to the play p and write lim
m→∞
(i)
pm = p if lim
m→∞
`(pm, p) = ∞ and
3For further reading, we refer to Kechris (1995).
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there exists M ∈ N such that for every m ≥ M, I(pm, p) ⊆ {i}. The notion of i-convergence thus
strengthens the notion of convergence by additionally imposing that eventually, if the plays pm
and p differ, player i is the only player who causes the first difference between pm and p. Clearly,
if a sequence of plays is i-convergent then it is also convergent.
In turn, this leads to a weakening of upper semicontinuity that we refer to as individual up-
per semicontinuity. The payoff function ui of player i is called i-upper semicontinuous if for each
play p ∈ P and each sequence (pm)m∈N that is i-convergent to p, i.e. lim
m→∞
(i)
pm = p, we have
lim sup
m→∞
ui(pm) ≤ ui(p). As each i-convergent sequence of plays is also convergent, it holds that
each upper semicontinuous payoff function is also i-upper semicontinuous. The converse however is
not true and there are even i-upper semicontinuous payoff functions that are not Borel measurable.
These issues are illustrated by Example 1 in Section 3.
Subgame perfect -equilibrium: Assume that for every player i ∈ I the payoff function ui is
bounded and Borel measurable. Then, for  ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ ∈ S is called a subgame
perfect -equilibrium if for each history h ∈ H, each player i ∈ I, and each strategy σ′i ∈ Si, we
have
Eh,σ [ui] ≥ Eh,σ′i,σ−i [ui]− .
In other words, σ is a subgame perfect -equilibrium if at each history h ∈ H it induces a Nash
-equilibrium. When  = 0, the concept of subgame perfect 0-equilibrium coincides with the usual
concept of subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Examples
In this section we discuss a few illustrative examples.
The first example demonstrates that i-upper semicontinuity of ui does not imply that ui is
upper semicontinuous. In fact, it does not even imply that ui is Borel measurable.
Example 1. Consider the following game with two players. At each stage, player 1 chooses an
action from the set {1, 2}. Player 2 is a dummy player, who can only choose action 0 at each
stage. The set of plays is thus P = ({1, 2}×{0})N. Let Q be a non-Borel set of P .4 Let the payoff
function u2 of player 2 be defined as u2(p) = 1 if p ∈ Q and u2(p) = 0 if p ∈ P \Q.
The payoff function u2 is clearly not Borel measurable and hence not upper semicontinuous
either. However, u2 is 2-upper semicontinuous. Indeed, take any sequence of plays (pm)m∈N that
is 2-converging to a play p. Since player 2 is a dummy player, we have pm = p for large m. Hence,
u2(pm) = u2(p) for large m, proving that u2 is 2-upper semicontinuous.
Of course, as long as the payoff function u1 is bounded and Borel measurable, the game admits
a subgame perfect -equilibrium for each  > 0. ♦
4The set P is an uncountable Polish space (essentially the Cantor space {1, 2}N), so P contains a non-Borel set,
see Corollary 6.7.11 in Bogachev (2007).
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The next example belongs to the class of so-called quitting games, see, for instance, Flesch et
al. (1997) and Solan and Vieille (2001).
Example 2. Consider the following game with two players. The set of actions is {c1, q1} for player
1 and {c2, q2} for player 2, with c1 and c2 standing for “continue” and q1 and q2 for “quit”. The
players choose actions simultaneously. For a play p ∈ P , let K1(p) denote the first stage at which
player 1 chooses action q1. If player 1 always chooses action c1, then K1(p) = ∞. We define
K2(p) similarly for player 2. The payoffs (u1(p), u2(p)) for the players are defined as follows. They
are equal to (0, 0) if K1(p) = K2(p) = ∞, i.e. if the players always choose “continue”, (−1, 1) if
K1(p) < K2(p), (1,−1) if K1(p) > K2(p), and (2, 2) if K1(p) = K2(p) < ∞. Note that u1 and u2
are symmetric and continuous everywhere, except at the play pc = ((c1, c2), (c1, c2), . . .).
We focus on player 1. The payoff function u1 is not upper semicontinuous. Indeed, for each
m ∈ N, consider the play pm in which (c1, c2) is chosen at the first m stages and (q1, q2) at stage
m + 1. The payoff for player 1 is 2 at each pm. However, the sequence (pm)m∈N converges to the
play pc, which only gives payoff 0 to player 1.
Nevertheless, u1 is 1-upper semicontinuous. Indeed, consider a sequence of plays (pm)m∈N that
is 1-convergent to the play pc. Then for large m we have either pm = p
c or K1(pm) < K2(pm).
Hence, for large m we obtain u1(pm) ≤ 0 = u1(pc). So, u1 is 1-upper semicontinuous.
A subgame perfect equilibrium in the game is obtained if player 1 always chooses action q1 and
player 2 always chooses action q2. Another subgame perfect equilibrium is for example to always
choose actions c1 and c2. ♦
We now illustrate the usefulness of i-upper semicontinuity by examining a class of games that
includes the game in Example 2 as a special case.
Example 3. Consider the two-player game of Example 2, where the action sets for player 1 and
2 is given by {c1, q1} and {c2, q2} respectively. At every stage both players pick an action from
their action space. The game ends when at least one player picks quit. Let uti,{j} denote the payoff
of player i when player j unilaterally decides to quit at stage t ∈ N and let ui,∅ denote the payoff
player i receives when quitting never takes place. For the sake of simplicity, assume that all payoffs
are integers. Note that a payoff function of this game is continuous everywhere, except possibly
at the play pc = ((c1, c2), (c1, c2), . . .).
The payoff function ui of player i is i-upper semicontinuous in this game if the payoff player
i receives when being the only one who quits at a late stage is at most the payoff player i would
receive if the game goes on indefinitely, i.e. if there exists a stage K ∈ N such that for each
k ≥ K we have uki,{i} ≤ ui,∅. This follows from the fact that the play pc is the only possible point
of discontinuity of ui and the assumption that all payoffs are integers.
We now explain why the game admits a subgame perfect equilibrium provided that for each
player i ∈ I the payoff function ui is i-upper semicontinuous. A generalization of the main idea
behind the construction constitutes the basis for the proof of Theorem 5. Assume that for each
player i ∈ I the payoff function ui is i-upper semicontinuous, and define a strategy profile σ ∈ S as
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Figure 1: The non-existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium and the stopping times τm1/5.
follows. Since for each player i ∈ I the payoff function ui is i-upper semicontinuous, there exists a
stage K such that, for each stage k ≥ K, for each player i ∈ I, we have uki,{i} ≤ ui,∅. Consequently,
after stage K, there is a play that is most preferred by both players: the play pc. Thus, after stage
K, we define σ1 and σ2 to continue indefinitely with probability 1. This implies that if stage no
one quits before stage K, σ gives player i a payoff of ui,∅. We complete the strategy profile σ by a
backward induction argument on the stages K − 1, K − 2, . . . , 1. By construction, σ constitutes a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. ♦
The following example shows that games with bounded and upper semicontinuous payoff func-
tions may have no subgame perfect equilibrium. This motivates the use of the concept of subgame
perfect -equilibrium.
Example 4. Consider the two-player centipede game depicted in Figure 1. Before we proceed, we
spell out some of our notational conventions.
First, whenever an action is taken from a singleton action set, it will be omitted from our
notation. Notice that, the game in Figure 1 having perfect information, at any given history only
one of the players has a non–singleton action set. In accordance with our convention, we will only
be recording the action taken by the active player. Thus for each t ∈ N∗ we write ct to denote the
history of length t obtained if the players, whenever it is their turn to move, take the action c. In
particular c0 is the empty history. The symbol ctq denotes the history of length t + 1 obtained if
the action q is chosen for the first time in period t+ 1.
Second, we assume that, once either player takes the action q, both players’ action sets become
singletons for the rest of the game. This implies that the game only has countably many plays,
which we denote by c0q, c1q, c2q, . . . and c∞. Here ctq denotes the play where action q is chosen
for the first time in period t + 1. The symbol c∞ is the play such that no one ever plays q. With
these conventions in place, we turn to the analysis of the game.
The payoff function of player 1 is upper semicontinuous and the payoff function of player 2 is
continuous. We show that the game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Suppose that σ = (σ1, σ2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. For each t ∈ N∗, let Pct,σ(c∞)
denote the probability that, in the subgame at history ct, under σ the play c∞ is realized. We
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distinguish two cases and derive a contradiction in each of them.
Assume first that for each t ∈ N∗ we have Pct,σ(c∞) = 0. As σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
it follows that at each history where player 1 is active, σ1 must place probability 1 on action q.
This implies that, at each history where player 2 is active, σ2 places probability 1 on action c. But
then player 1 would have a profitable deviation from σ1 by always choosing the action c, which is
a contradiction.
Assume now that for some t ∈ N∗ we have Pct,σ(c∞) > 0. Then, Pck,σ(c∞) converges to 1
as k → ∞. So there exists K ∈ N∗ such that, for each k ≥ K, player 1’s expected payoff at
history ck is strictly more than 1, Eck,σ[u1] > 1. As σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium, σ1 places
probability 1 on action c at each history where player 1 is active beyond stage K. This implies that
σ2 places probability 1 on action q at each history where player 2 is active beyond stage K. But this
contradicts Pct,σ(c∞) > 0. Consequently, the game does not have a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Note however that for each  > 0 there exists a pure subgame perfect -equilibrium. Indeed,
fix  > 0. Then there is K ∈ N such that if neither player quits before stage K then all feasible
payoffs for player 2 are at most . Now the following pure strategy profile constitutes a subgame
perfect -equilibrium: player 1 quits at each history, whereas player 2 continues at each history
before stage K and quits at each history after stage K. Note that this strategy profile can be found
as follows: let player 2 quit at each history after stage K and, given this, use backward induction
at the various parts of the game tree. This is in line with the construction that we provide in the
proof of Theorem 5. ♦
4 Existence of a subgame perfect -equilibrium
The goal of this section is to present and prove the existence result, Theorem 5, for subgame perfect
-equilibria in games with almost perfect information as defined in Section 2.
Section 4 is structured as follows. In the first subsection, we present and discuss this existence
result. In the second subsection, we examine some implications of individual upper semicontinuity
in more detail. In the third subsection, we provide the proof.
4.1 The existence result
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Consider a game G with almost perfect information as defined in Section 2. If for
every player i ∈ I the payoff function ui is bounded, Borel measurable, and i-upper semicontinuous,
then, for each  > 0, the game admits a subgame perfect -equilibrium, which is eventually pure.
Theorem 5 generalizes the result of Purves and Sudderth (2011) on the existence of subgame
perfect -equilibria in perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoff functions in
two directions. First, as each upper semicontinuous function ui is also Borel measurable and i-
upper semicontinuous, we reduce the topological restrictions on the payoff functions of the players.
Second, we allow the players to move simultaneously.
9
We provide a constructive proof for Theorem 5 in the next subsections. We remark that our
proof is different from the one in Purves and Sudderth (2011), who after discretization of the
payoffs, make use of an induction argument on the cardinality of the available payoffs in the
subgames.
We discuss extensions of Theorem 5 and the necessity of the conditions in Section 6. Note
Example 4 demonstrates that the conditions in Theorem 5 do not guarantee the existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
4.2 Optimal plays
Consider a player i ∈ I. For every play p ∈ P and stage t ∈ N∗, we define the set Oi(p, t) as the
set consisting of the play p and all other plays q 6= p such that q coincides with p until at least
stage t and the first deviation from p to q is caused by player i alone. That is,
Oi(p, t) = {p} ∪ {q ∈ P |`(p, q) ≥ t and I(p, q) = {i}}. (1)
Note that Oi(p, t) is non-empty as it contains the play p.
Now we formulate a condition such that a player does not wish to deviate from a play after a
certain stage.
Definition 6. Consider a player i ∈ I and some  > 0. A play p ∈ P is (, i)-optimal after stage
t if for each play q ∈ Oi(p, t)
ui(p) ≥ ui(q)− .
A play p ∈ P is -optimal after stage t if it is (, i)-optimal after stage t for each player i ∈ I. A
play p ∈ P is -optimal after history h if h ≺ p and p is -optimal after stage ‖h‖.
The concept of -optimality is defined as a property of a play and not as a property of a strategy
profile. Further, if the play p is -optimal after stage t then, for each k ≥ t, the play p is also
-optimal after stage k.
Lemma 7 and Corollary 8 relate individual upper semicontinuity and -optimality.
Lemma 7. Consider a player i ∈ I and assume that player i’s payoff function ui is bounded. Then
ui is i-upper semicontinuous if and only if for each play p ∈ P and for each  > 0, there exists a
stage t ∈ N∗ such that the play p is (, i)-optimal after stage t.
Proof. Assume that the payoff function ui is i-upper semicontinuous. Take a play p ∈ P and some
 > 0.
Suppose that for each t ∈ N∗ there exists a play qt ∈ Oi(p, t) such that
ui(p) < ui(qt)− .
By construction, the sequence of plays (qt)t∈N∗ is i-convergent to p and ui(p) ≤ lim supt→∞ ui(qt)−.
This contradicts the assumption that ui is i-upper semicontinuous.
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For the other direction, fix a play p ∈ P and some  > 0. Then, by assumption there exists
a stage t ∈ N∗ such that for every play qt ∈ Oi(p, t), ui(p) ≥ ui(qt) − . Take any sequence
of plays (pm)m∈N that i-converges to the play p. Then there exists M ∈ N such that for every
m ≥ M, pm ∈ Oi(p, t). Consequently, for every m ≥ M, ui(p) ≥ ui(pm) − . We conclude that
ui(p) ≥ lim supm→∞ ui(pm)− . Since this holds for any play p ∈ P and any  > 0, it follows that
ui is i-upper semicontinuous.
Since the set of players is finite, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Assume that, for each player i ∈ I, the payoff function ui is bounded and i-upper
semicontinuous. Then, for each play p ∈ P and for each  > 0, there exists a stage t ∈ N∗ such
that the play p is -optimal after stage t.
The next definition presents the notion of an -optimal history.
Definition 9. Let  > 0. A history h ∈ H is -optimal if there exists a play p ∈ P which is
-optimal after history h.
In our construction of a subgame perfect -equilibrium, strategy profiles will be such that in a
subgame corresponding to an -optimal history h, an -optimal play after history h is followed.
For  > 0, the number of times a history h ∈ H has an initial segment which is -optimal is
denoted by n(h), so
n(h) = |{t ∈ N∗ | t ≤ `(h) and h|t is -optimal}|.
Next, for m ∈ N, the stopping time τm is defined by
τm (p) = min{t ∈ N∗ | n(p|t) = m}, p ∈ P.
In words, τm (p) is the stage at which it occurs for the m-th time that a prefix of p is -optimal.
Note that this does not mean that the play p needs to be -optimal from this prefix.
The following lemma claims that all these stopping times are uniformly bounded.
Lemma 10. For every  > 0, for every m ∈ N, there exists Km ∈ N∗ such that for each play
p ∈ P we have τm (p) ≤ Km .
Proof. Let some  > 0 and some m ∈ N be given.
Suppose that supp∈P τ
m
 (p) = ∞. Then, by finiteness of the set A(ø) of possible stage game
outcomes at stage 1, there is a1 ∈ A(ø) such that supp(a1) τm (p) =∞. Then, for the same reason,
there is a2 ∈ A(a1) such that supp(a1,a2) τm (p) = ∞. Continuing this way, we obtain a play
p = (a1, a2, . . .) for which τm (p) =∞. This is however in contradiction with Corollary 8.
Example 11. Consider again the two-player centipede game depicted in Figure 1 and discussed
in Example 4. For the remainder of the example take  = 1/5. We will now compute the stopping
times τm1/5(p) for all m ∈ N and all plays p ∈ P . To do this we start by finding all 1/5-optimal
11
∅ T
1
∅
p11
h1r
T 2h1r
p21
p22
p32
p31
p33h
3
r
T 3h3r
h2r T
2
h2r
p23
p24
Figure 2: Construction of a subgame perfect -equilibrium.
histories.
Part 1: All histories h /∈ {∅, c2} are 1/5-optimal.
First note that all histories which contain a quitting action are clearly 1/5-optimal. All other
histories have the form ct for some t ∈ N∗.
The history c0 = ∅ is not 1/5-optimal. Indeed, the only (1/5, 1)-optimal play after ∅ is c∞.
However, c∞ is not an (1/5, 2)-optimal play after ∅ because the play cq gives player 2 a payoff
strictly higher than 1/5. Likewise the history c2 is not 1/5-optimal: c∞ is the only (1/5, 1)-optimal
play after history c2, but it is not (1/5, 2)-optimal after c2, because the play c3q gives player 2 a
payoff strictly higher than 1/5.
The history c is 1/5-optimal because the play cq is 1/5-optimal after history c. To see this,
notice that player 1 cannot profitably deviate from cq after history c since history c is controlled
by player 2. And any deviation from the play cq by Player 2 after history c can increase player 2’s
payoff by no more than 1/2− 1/3 < 1/5. Using an analogous argument one can easily show that
history c3 is 1/5-optimal as the play c3q is 1/5-optimal after this history.
All histories ct with t ≥ 4 are 1/5-optimal because the play c∞ becomes 1/5-optimal after
history c4. Indeed, once history c4 has occurred neither player can gain an additional payoff of
more than 1/5 by quitting.
Part 2: The stopping times τm(p).
From part 1 it now easily follows that τm1/5(p) = m if m = 1 or if p ∈ {q, cq}. While τm1/5(p) = m+1
if m ≥ 2 and p /∈ {q, cq}. ♦
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4.3 The proof of Theorem 5
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 5. Assume that for every player i ∈ I the payoff function ui
is bounded, Borel measurable, and i-upper semicontinuous. Fix  > 0. Our goal is to construct a
subgame perfect -equilibrium σ. The construction is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. The trees
T kh are defined in the proof.
Step 1: We start from the root of the game, at history ø. Along each play p ∈ P , the first
-optimal history is given by p|τ1 (p). Let H
1 denote the set of all these -optimal histories:
H1 = {p|τ1 (p) ∈ H|p ∈ P}.
For each history h ∈ H1, choose a play ph that is -optimal after h.
Let T 1ø denote the subtree that consists of all the histories that can occur at or before this
stopping time τ 1 , so
T 1ø = {h ∈ H|∃h1 ∈ H1 : h  h1}.
In view of Lemma 10, the tree T 1ø is finite. That is, the set of non-terminal nodes of T
1
ø is the finite
set
Z1 = {h ∈ H|∃h1 ∈ H1 : h ≺ h1}
and the terminal histories of T 1ø are exactly the histories in H
1. At each terminal history h1 ∈ H1,
for each player i ∈ I, we define the terminal payoff of T 1ø to be ui(ph1). Intuitively, if h1 is reached,
then player i receives the payoff corresponding to the -optimal play ph
1
extending h1. Given these
terminal payoffs, we can find a subgame perfect equilibrium σ1ø for T
1
ø by backward induction. Note
that σ1ø is not necessarily pure, due to the potential presence of simultaneous moves.
For each h1 ∈ H1, let W 1(h1) denote the prefixes of the play ph1 after the subtree T 1ø :
W 1(h1) = {h ∈ H|h1  h ≺ ph1}.
Define
W 1 = ∪h1∈H1W 1(h1).
We now define the strategy profile σ for histories belonging to Z1 and W 1. The strategy profile
σ equals σ1ø at histories in Z
1 and follows the -optimal plays at histories in W 1. Thus, for every
h ∈ Z1 we define σ(h) = σ1ø(h) and, for every h1 ∈ H1, for every h ∈ W 1(h1), σ(h) puts probability
1 on ph
1
[‖h‖+1].
Step 2: Now we proceed by considering the minimal histories outside Z1 ∪W 1. These are the
histories that arise outside T 1ø when along a play p
h1 with h1 ∈ H1 a deviation occurs from ph1 .
That is, we are considering the set of histories
R2 =
⋃
h1∈H1
{ha ∈ H | h ∈ W 1(h1), a ∈ A(h)} \W 1(h1).
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For each history h◦ = ha ∈ R2, we execute the following. Similarly to step 1, by using the
boundedness of stopping times, we let H2(h◦) be the set of minimal -optimal histories h2 with
initial segment h◦ such that n(h2) = n(h) + 1, so
H2(h◦) = {p|τn(h)+1 (p) ∈ H|p ∈ P (h
◦)}.
Let T 2h◦ denote the finite subtree with root h
◦ that consists of all histories that can occur at or
before the stopping time τ
n(h)+1
 , so
T 2h◦ = {h′ ∈ H | ∃h2 ∈ H2(h◦) : h◦  h′  h2}.
Let Z2(h◦) denote the set of non-terminal histories belonging to T 2h◦ . The terminal histories of
T 2h◦ are precisely the histories in H
2(h◦). For each history h2 ∈ H2(h◦), choose a play ph2 that is
-optimal after h2. At each terminal history h2 ∈ H2(h◦), for each player i ∈ I, we define the
terminal payoff of T 2h◦ to be ui(p
h2). Given these terminal payoffs, we can find a subgame perfect
equilibrium σ2h◦ for T
2
h◦ by backward induction. Once again, σ
2
h◦ is not necessarily pure.
Just like in step 1, for each h2 ∈ H2(h◦), let W 2(h◦, h2) denote the histories along the play ph2
after the subtree T 2h◦ , and let W
2(h◦) be the union of these sets. We define the strategy profile σ at
histories belonging to Z2(h◦) and W 2(h◦): the strategy profile σ equals σ2h◦ at histories in Z
2(h◦)
and follows the -optimal plays at histories in W 2(h◦).
All further steps, and conclusion: By repeating this construction with steps in N, we
eventually consider each history of the game: certain histories belong to a finite subtree and
certain histories are -optimal. This yields a fully specified strategy profile σ. By construction, σ
is a subgame perfect -equilibrium. Indeed, a player cannot gain more than  by deviating along
an -optimal play, and given this, it is never profitable to deviate at histories belonging to a finite
subtree.
Moreover, as the prescription for σ along the -optimal plays does not use randomization, σ is
eventually pure in every subgame. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
5 The topology induced by i-convergence
In this section, we examine the topology induced by the notion of i-convergence. We give criteria
for metrizability, compactness, and separability for this topology.
5.1 The topological space (P, Ti)
In this subsection, we fix a player i ∈ I and define a topology Ti on the set of plays and show
that a sequence of plays converges to a play p with respect to this topology Ti exactly when this
sequence of plays i-converges to p. We also examine the relationship between the topology Ti and
the topology T .
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For every play p ∈ P and stage t ∈ N∗, the set Oi(p, t) is defined in (1). Let Ti be the topology
on P that is induced by the collection of sets Oi = {Oi(p, t)|p ∈ P, t ∈ N∗}. That is, Ti is the
smallest topology on P that contains each set belonging to Oi. As the next lemma shows, the
collection Oi forms a basis of the topology Ti. This means that for a set O ⊆ P , we have O ∈ Ti
exactly when O can be written as a union of sets belonging to Oi.
Lemma 12. The collection Oi is a basis for the topology Ti.
Proof. We only need to show (cf. Aliprantis and Border, page 25) that, for any two sets Oi(p, s) ∈
Oi and Oi(q, t) ∈ Oi, the intersection Oi(p, s) ∩ Oi(q, t) can be written as a union of sets in Oi.
Let O = Oi(p, s)∩Oi(q, t). We can assume without loss of generality that s ≤ t. We distinguish a
number of cases and show in each case that O is indeed such a union.
Case 1: p = q. In this case, O = Oi(q, t), so we are done.
Case 2: p 6= q. Then `(p, q) <∞. We divide this case into three subcases.
Subcase 2.1: `(p, q) < s ≤ t. This case is trivial, as O = ∅.
Subcase 2.2: s ≤ `(p, q) < t. If I(p, q) = {i} then O = Oi(q, t). If I(p, q) 6= {i} then O = ∅.
Subcase 2.3: s ≤ t ≤ `(p, q). If I(p, q) = {i} then O = Oi(q, t). If I(p, q) 6= {i}, then O is the
union of the sets P (ha) where the history h ∈ H and the stage outcome a ∈ A have the properties:
(a) h is a common prefix of p and q with length t ≤ ‖h‖ ≤ `(p, q) − 1, (b) ha ∈ H, (c) at the
history h, the stage game outcome a ∈ A deviates from the common prefix of p and q, but the
only difference is caused by player i. Note that each such set P (ha) is a union of sets in Oi, hence
we are done.
The next lemma gives some basic properties of the topological space (P, Ti).
Lemma 13. The topological space (P, Ti) is:
1. Hausdorff.
2. First countable.
3. Sequential.
Proof.
1. If p 6= q then `(p, q) <∞ and hence Oi(p, `(p, q) + 1) and Oi(q, `(p, q) + 1) are disjoint open
sets containing p and q, respectively.
2. Take a play p ∈ P . Then the sequence Oi(p, 1) ⊇ Oi(p, 2) ⊇ . . . is a countable neighborhood
basis for p.
3. Follows immediately from (2).
Because the topological space (P, Ti) is sequential, it is fully determined by its convergent
sequences. In the following lemma we show that the convergent sequences of (P, Ti) are precisely the
i-convergent sequences, thereby proving that Ti is indeed the topology induced by i-convergence.
Lemma 14. A sequence of plays (pm)m∈N converges to the play p in the topological space (P, Ti)
if and only if the sequence (pm)m∈N i-converges to the play p.
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Proof. Take a sequence of plays (pm)m∈N that converges to the play p in the topological space
(P, Ti). For each t ∈ N∗, the set Oi(p, t) is an open neighborhood of the play p, i.e. p ∈ Oi(p, t) ∈ Ti.
Hence, for each t ∈ N∗, there exists a constant Mt ∈ N such that for all m ≥ Mt we have
pm ∈ Oi(p,Mt). Therefore, lim
m→∞
`(pm, p) = ∞ and for all m ≥ M1 we have I(pm, p) ⊆ {i}. This
means that the sequence (pm)m∈N i-converges to the play p.
Conversely, take a sequence of plays (pm)m∈N that i-converges to the play p. Consider an open
neighborhood O of the play p, i.e. p ∈ O ∈ Ti. By Lemma 12, there exists t ∈ N∗ such that
Oi(p, t) ⊆ O. Since we assumed that (pm)m∈N is i-convergent to p, there exists M ∈ N such that
for each m ≥ M we have (a) `(pm, p) ≥ t and (b) I(pm, p) ⊆ {i}. Thus, for each m ≥ M we have
pm ∈ Oi(p, t) and in particular pm ∈ O. Therefore, (pm)m∈N converges to p in the topological space
(P, Ti).
p
(00)t+1(01) . . .
(00)t(01) . . .
(00)t(10) . . .
(00)t+1(11) . . .
Figure 3: The topology T1.
p
(00)t+1(01) . . .
(00)t(01) . . .
(00)t(10) . . .
(00)t+1(11) . . .
Figure 4: The topology T2.
p
(00)t+1(01) . . .
(00)t(01) . . .
(00)t(10) . . .
(00)t+1(11) . . .
Figure 5: The topology T1 ∩ T2.
p
(00)t+1(01) . . .
(00)t(01) . . .
(00)t(10) . . .
(00)t+1(11) . . .
Figure 6: The topology T .
Figure 7: Local basis of the play p = (00)∞ in the topology T1, T2, T1 ∩ T2 and T , respectively,
for a 2-player multistage game where, for every h ∈ H, for i = 1, 2, Ai(h) = {0, 1}. The Euclidean
distance between any play and the play p is inversely related to the length of the longest common
history, while the circle sector indicates the subset of players who first deviated.
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Lemma 15. The topology Ti is finer than the topology T , that is, Ti ⊇ T .
Proof. For every history h ∈ H and for each play p ∈ P (h) it holds that p ∈ Oi(p, ‖h‖) ⊆ P (h),
and hence we have that P (h) = ∪p∈P (h)Oi(p, ‖h‖). Therefore, we have that Ti contains each set
P (h). As the topology T is induced by these sets, we obtain Ti ⊇ T .
Note that Ti is strictly larger than T in certain games. Consider the game in Example 4. The
set O1(c
∞, 1) belongs to T1 and it contains the play c∞ and all plays in which player 1 quits at
stage 3 or later. However, O1(c
∞, 1) does not belong to T for the following reason. There is no
history h ∈ H such that c∞ ∈ P (h) ⊆ O1(c∞, 1). As the sets P (h), where h ∈ H, form a basis of
the topology T , we conclude that O1(c∞, 1) /∈ T .
Now we turn to the question when Ti coincides with T . The answer, and also the answer to
many other questions, depends on the size of the action sets along each play. For this purpose, we
introduce the notions of i-finiteness and i-cofiniteness of a play.
Definition 16. A play p ∈ P is i-finite if there exists a stage K ∈ N∗ such that at every prefix of
p with length at least K the set of available actions to player i is a singleton, so for every k ≥ K,
|Ai(p|k)| = 1.
Thus, if a play p is i-finite then, after finitely many stages, it is not within the power of player
i to deviate from p. Let Fi = {p ∈ P |p is i-finite} denote the subset of i-finite plays of the P .
Definition 17. A play p ∈ P is i-cofinite if there exists a stage K ∈ N∗ such that at every prefix
of p with length at least K the set of available actions to every player j 6= i is a singleton, so for
every k ≥ K, for every j 6= i, |Aj(p|k)| = 1.
Thus, if a play p is i-cofinite then, after finitely many stages, player i has full control over the
realization of the play p. Let Ci = {p ∈ P |p is i-cofinite} denote the subset of i-cofinite plays of
the P .
Note that there can be plays that are neither i-finite nor i-cofinite and that a play can be both
i-finite and i-cofinite.
As it turns out, Ti = T holds if and only if the topological space (P, Ti) is compact if and only
if each play is i-cofinite.
Proposition 18. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) Ti = T .
(2) The topological space (P, Ti) is compact.
(3) Each play p ∈ P is i-cofinite, i.e. P = Ci.
Proof. We prove that (1) and (2) are equivalent and that (1) and (3) are equivalent as well.
(1) implies (2): This is immediate because (P, T ) is compact.
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(2) implies (1): As we know, (P, T ) is a compact Hausdorff space. By assumption, (P, Ti) is
compact as well and by Lemma 13 it is Hausdorff too. Because Ti ⊇ T due to Proposition 15, the
maximality principle of compact Hausdorff spaces implies that Ti = T .5
(1) implies (3): Suppose there exists a play p ∈ P which is not i-cofinite. Then there is an
infinite set T ⊆ N∗ of stages such that at each prefix of p with length t ∈ T there is a player jt 6= i
with an action set containing at least two alternatives, so |Ajt(p|t)| ≥ 2. For each t ∈ T , let pt be
a play in which the first difference from p is caused by the action of player jt at stage t. Then, the
sequence of plays (pt)t∈T is convergent to the play p, but not i-convergent. Because both Ti and
T are fully determined by the convergent sequences, this contradicts the assumption that Ti = T .
Consequently, it follows that every play p ∈ P is i-cofinite.
(3) implies (1): Because both Ti and T are determined by their convergent sequences it is
sufficient to show that if all plays are i-cofinite then every convergent sequence is also i-convergent.
To this end, fix a play p ∈ P and a sequence (pm)m∈N that converges to the play p, i.e. lim
m→∞
pm = p.
Because the play p is i-cofinite, there exists a time t∗ such that for every player j 6= i and every
t ≥ t∗ |Aj(p|t)| = 1. Because the sequence (pm)m∈N is convergent to the play p we have that there
exists an M ∈ N∗ such that, for all m ≥M , `(pm, p) ≥ t∗. Furthermore we have that I(pm, p) ⊆ {i}
for all m ≥M . We can conclude that lim
m→∞
(i)
pm = p.
A topological space is called separable if it contains a countable dense subset. The separability
of (P, Ti) depends on the cardinality of the set of plays which are i-finite. The reason is that each
i-finite play, as a singleton, is open in Ti.
Proposition 19. The topological space (P, Ti) is separable if and only if the subset of i-finite plays
Fi is countable.
Proof. First notice that, for every p ∈ Fi, the singleton {p} is open in Ti. Indeed, as p is i-finite,
there is a stage t such that at any prefix of p with length at least t player i’s action set is a singleton.
It follows that {p} = Oi(p, t) ∈ Ti.
Part 1: Assume that (P, Ti) is separable and let D be a countable dense subset of P . For each
p ∈ Fi, the singleton {p} is open in Ti, so we have Fi ⊆ D. It follows that Fi is countable.
Part 2: Assume that Fi is countable. We show that (P, Ti) is separable by constructing a countable
dense subset of P .
For every history h ∈ H, fix a play ph ∈ P (h). Because the set H of histories is countable and
because Fi is countable by assumption, the set D = {ph|h ∈ H} ∪ Fi is countable too. We claim
that D is dense in P with respect to Ti.
5If (X,V) is a compact Hausdorff space and W is another topology on X such that W strictly includes V, then
the topological space (X,W) is not compact. Indeed, take a set U ∈ W \ V. As U is not open in V, the set X \ U
is not closed in V. Because (X,V) is Hausdorff, X \ U is not compact in V and hence X \ U is not compact in W.
However, by the choice of U , the set X \ U is closed in W. Hence, (X,W) cannot be compact.
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It suffices to show that, for every p /∈ D, for every stage t ∈ N∗, Oi(p, t) ∩ D 6= ∅. Take a
play p /∈ D and a stage t ∈ N∗. As p /∈ D we also have p /∈ Fi, and hence there exists a prefix h
of p such that ‖h‖ ≥ t and |Ai(h)| ≥ 2. Consider a history h′ of length ‖h‖ + 1 such that (a) h′
coincides with h at the first ‖h‖ stages and (b) at stage ‖h‖+ 1, h′ differs from the play p only by
the action of player i. Then, ph
′ ∈ Oi(p, t) ∩D.
The following proposition shows that (P, Ti) is not metrizable under mild conditions.
Proposition 20. If the set Fi ∪Ci is finite and P \ (Fi ∪Ci) is infinite, then the topological space
(P, Ti) is not metrizable.
Proof. Suppose di : P × P → [0,∞) is a metric which induces the topology Ti.
Step 1: Construction of two sequences of plays (pm)m∈N and (qm)m∈N.
In this step we inductively construct two sequences of plays (pm)m∈N and (qm)m∈N as illustrated in
Figure 8.
Start with any play p1 which is not i-finite. Because the play p1 is not i-finite and there
are infinitely many plays which are not i-cofinite there exists a play q1 with the following three
properties (1) I(p1, q1) = {i}, (2) q1 is not i-cofinite, and (3) di(p1, q1) < 1/2. Indeed, the fact that
the play p1 is not i-finite guarantees that there exists an eventually non-constant sequence of plays
which i-converges to the play p1. This guarantees that this sequence of plays contains an element
q1 having all the desired properties.
Now assume that for some m ∈ N the plays pm and qm are defined such that pm is not i-finite
and qm is not i-cofinite. Take any play pm+1 that is not i-finite such that pm+1 coincides with the
play qm on a longer history than the play pm and such that the first time the play pm+1 differs
from qm is not solely due to player i, so
`(pm, qm) < `(pm+1, qm) and I(pm+1, qm) \ {i} 6= ∅. (2)
Because the play pm+1 is not i-finite it is possible to choose the play qm+1 in such a way that qm+1
is not i-cofinite and
`(pm+1, qm) < `(pm+1, qm+1), I(pm+1, qm+1) = {i}, and di(pm+1, qm+1) < 2−(m+1). (3)
Step 2: Finding a contradiction
For m ∈ N, let hm = min(pm, qm) denote the longest common history between the play pm and the
play qm. Notice that by construction we have h1 ≺ h2 ≺ · · · . Therefore there exists a unique play
p extending all histories hm. Note that for every m ∈ N we have that
`(p, pm) = `(pm, qm) < `(pm+1, qm) < `(pm+1, qm+1) = `(p, pm+1).
It follows that lim
m→∞
`(p, pm) =∞. Furthermore, we have that I(p, pm) = I(pm, qm) = {i}. There-
fore, we can conclude that lim
m→∞
(i)
pm = p and hence lim
m→∞
di(p, pm) = 0. Furthermore, we have
by construction that lim
m→∞
di(pm, qm) = 0. It follows from the triangle inequality that, for every
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Figure 8: The non-metrizability of the topology of i-convergence.
m ∈ N, di(p, qm) ≤ di(p, pm) + di(pm, qm). This yields that lim
m→∞
di(p, qm) = 0 and consequently
lim
m→∞
(i)
qm = p. However, by construction we have that, for every m ∈ N, I(p, qm) = I(pm, qm) * {i},
so we have obtained a contradiction.
Example 21. Proposition 20 implies that the topological space (P, Ti) induced by an infinitely
repeated stage game in which all players have at least two actions is not metrizable. Indeed, every
play in such a game is neither i-finite nor i-cofinite and there are infinitely many plays.
Even though in general the topological space (P, Ti) is not metrizable, there are games for
which the associated topological space is metrizable.
Lemma 22. If P = Fi ∪ Ci, then the topological space (P, Ti) is metrizable.
Proof. Let Fi,k denote the set of i–finite plays such that Ai(p|t) is a singleton for each t ≥ k. Thus
Fi,1, Fi,2, . . . is a non-decreasing sequence of sets converging to the set of i-finite plays Fi. Let
δ(p) = 0 for each p /∈ Fi and let δ(p) = 2−k for each p ∈ Fi,k \ Fi,k−1.
Define di(p, p) = 0 for each p ∈ P , and for two distinct plays p, q ∈ P we let di(p, q) =
max{d(p, q), δ(p), δ(q)}, where d is the usual ultrametric defined by d(p, q) = 2−`(p,q). We now
show that because d is an ultrametric, di is as well. By definition we have that di(p, p) = 0 for all
p ∈ P , furthermore it is trivial to see that di is non-negative and symmetric. It remains to show
that di(p, q) ≤ max{di(p, r), di(r, q)} for any p, q, r ∈ P . We have
di(p, q) ≤ max{d(p, r), d(r, q), δ(p), δ(q)}
≤ max{d(p, r), d(r, q), δ(p), δ(q), δ(r)}
= max{di(p, r), di(r, q)}.
We now show that the metric di induces the topology Ti of i-convergence.
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Part 1: If limm→∞ di(pm, p) = 0 then the sequence (pm)m∈N i-converges to p.
Suppose the sequence (pm)m∈N converges to p under the metric di. First assume that p ∈ Fi then
because p is i-finite there exists M ∈ N such that pm = p for all m ≥ M , which implies that
I(pm, p) = ∅ and `(pm, p) = ∞ for all m ≥ M . We can conclude that (pm)m∈N i-converges to
p. Now assume that p ∈ Ci and note that because d ≤ di we have that the sequence (pm)m∈N
converges to p under the metric d. Furthermore observe that any sequence of plays that converges
to p ∈ Ci under the metric d also i–converges to p.
Part 2: If the sequence (pm)m∈N i-converges to p then limm→∞ di(pm, p) = 0
If the sequence (pm)m∈N i–converges to p, then limk→∞ d(pk, p) = 0 and there exists an M ∈ N
such that I(pm, p) ⊆ {i} for every m ≥ M . Let nm = `(pm, p). Then for each m ≥ M we have
that either pm = p or the set Ai(pm|nk) = Ai(p|nm) is not a singleton. From this we can conclude
that p and pm are not elements of Fi,nm . Therefore δ(p) ≤ 2−nm and δ(pm) ≤ 2−nm . Because
limm→∞ nm = ∞ and limm→∞ d(pm, p) = 0 we conclude that pm converges to p under the metric
di.
5.2 The topological space (P,∩i∈ITi)
In this section, we take a closer look at the collection ∩i∈ITi of sets which are open in every
topological space (P, Ti). By Proposition 15 we have Ti ⊇ T and hence ∩i∈ITi ⊇ T . It is now a
natural question to ask whether in fact ∩i∈ITi = T . As we will see, this is the case for perfect
information games, but not in general.
For every play p ∈ P and stage t ∈ N∗, let
O∗(p, t) = ∪i∈IOi(p, t)
= {q ∈ P |`(p, q) ≥ t and |I(p, q)| ≤ 1}.
Let T ∗ be the topology on P that is induced by the collection B∗ = {O∗(p, t)|p ∈ P, t ∈ N∗}.
That is, T ∗ is the smallest topology on P that contains each set belonging to B∗. As the next
lemma shows, the collection B∗ forms a basis of the topology T ∗. This means that for a set O ⊆ P ,
we have O ∈ T ∗ exactly when O can be written as a union of sets in B∗.
Lemma 23. The collection B∗ is a basis for the topology T ∗.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 12. We only need to show (cf. Aliprantis and Border,
page 25) that, for any two sets O∗(p, s) ∈ B∗ and O∗(q, t) ∈ B∗, the intersection O∗(p, s)∩O∗(q, t)
can be written as a union of sets in B∗. Let O∗ = O∗(p, s) ∩O∗(q, t). We can assume without loss
of generality that s ≤ t. We distinguish a number of cases and prove in each case that O∗ is indeed
such a union.
Case 1: p = q. In this case O∗ = O∗(q, t) and we are done.
Case 2: p 6= q. It follows that `(p, q) <∞. We divide this case into three subcases.
Subcase 2.1: `(p, q) < s ≤ t. In this case it holds that O∗ = ∅.
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Subcase 2.2: s ≤ `(p, q) < t. If I(p, q) is a singleton, then O∗ = O∗(q, t). If I(p, q) is not a
singleton, so multiple players cause the first difference between p and q, then O∗ = ∅.
Subcase 2.3: s ≤ t ≤ `(p, q). If I(p, q) is a singleton, then O∗ = O∗(p, s) = O∗(q, t). If
I(p, q) is not a singleton, then O∗ is the union of the sets P (ha) where the history h ∈ H and
the stage outcome a ∈ A have the properties: (a) h is a common prefix of p and q with length
t ≤ ‖h‖ ≤ `(p, q) − 1, (b) ha ∈ H, (c) at the history h, the stage game outcome a ∈ A deviates
from the common prefix of p and q and the difference is caused by exactly one player. Because for
every history h ∈ H we have P (h) = ∪p∈P (h)Oi(p, ‖h‖), each such set P (ha) is a union of sets in
B∗, and hence we are done.
We now show that the topologies T ∗ and ∩i∈ITi coincide. Hence, B∗ is a basis for the topology
∩i∈ITi.
Lemma 24. T ∗ = ∩i∈ITi.
Proof.
Part 1: T ∗ ⊇ ∩i∈ITi.
Let O ∈ ∩i∈ITi be given. It is sufficient to show that for every p ∈ O there exists t ∈ N∗ such
that O∗(p, t) ⊆ O. Let some p ∈ O be given. For every i ∈ I there exists ti ∈ N∗ such that
Oi(p, ti) ⊆ O. For t = maxi∈I ti it holds that, for every i ∈ I, Oi(p, t) ⊆ O. It follows that
O∗(p, t) = ∪i∈IOi(p, t) ⊆ O.
Part 2: T ∗ ⊆ ∩i∈ITi.
Fix a play p ∈ P and a time t ∈ N∗. It is sufficient to prove that, for every i ∈ I, O∗(p, t) ∈ Ti. Fix
some player i ∈ I. Let some q ∈ O∗(p, t) be given. It is sufficient to show that there exists k ∈ N∗
such that Oi(q, k) ⊆ O∗(p, t). If q = p, then let k = t, so we have that Oi(p, t) ⊆ ∪j∈IOj(p, t) =
O∗(p, t) and we are done. If q 6= p, then there exists k ∈ N such that k > `(p, q) ≥ t. It is immediate
that Oi(q, k) ⊆ O∗(p, t).
Because in perfect information games at every stage only one player can deviate from a given
play, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 25. Consider a game G as defined in Section 2 with perfect information. It holds
that T ∗ = T .
Proof. Because G has perfect information, we have for every play p ∈ P and stage t ∈ N∗ that
O∗(p, t) = {q ∈ P |`(p, q) ≥ t} = P (p|t). Hence T ∗ and T have the same basis and the statement
follows.
Corollary 26. If a sequence of plays is convergent in T ∗, then it is convergent in T as well. The
converse holds for perfect information games.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Perfect information games
In Theorem 5, we assumed that the set of available actions is always finite. This has two conse-
quences. First, when applying backward induction in the proof of Theorem 5, we were guaranteed
to have a subgame perfect equilibrium in each finite tree. Second, each stopping time τ k is bounded.
The second consequence is not essential. Even with unbounded, but finite, stopping times we
would obtain subtrees in the proof of Theorem 5 that have no infinite branches. Hence, it would
still be possible to apply backward induction by the following idea. Start at the root of a subtree.
If there is a child history that is non-terminal, then take this history, and repeat this process as
long as it is possible to choose a non-terminal child history. Since there is no infinite branch, this
process will eventually stop at a history such that all of its children are terminal histories. Then,
apply a step of backward induction at this history. By means of a transfinite procedure, applying
a step of backward induction at each iteration step, we finally end up with a complete strategy
profile for this subtree, and this strategy profile is thus a subgame perfect equilibrium for this
subtree.
The first consequence is important though. Still, it would be enough to have a one-shot -
equilibrium in each possible stage game, for every  > 0. In particular, this would be the case if
the game under consideration has perfect information, even if the set of available actions is not
finite. To be more precise, this leads to the following statement.
Consider a perfect information game that satisfies the assumptions of Section 2, without the
requirement that the set of available actions of each player is finite. If the payoff function ui of
every player i ∈ I is bounded and i-upper semicontinuous, then for each  > 0, the game admits
a pure strategy profile such that in any subgame, no player can gain more than  by unilaterally
deviating to another pure strategy.
This statement generalizes the corresponding result in Purves and Sudderth [17], by relaxing
the topological condition on the payoff functions.
6.2 Necessity of the conditions in Theorem 5
In this subsection, we discuss to which extent the conditions assumed in Theorem 5 are necessary
for the existence of a subgame perfect -equilibrium, for every  > 0.
The assumption that the set of available actions is always finite was already discussed in the
previous subsection.
We also assumed in Theorem 5 that the payoffs are bounded. This is a standard assumption,
and without this assumption even very simple 1-player games fail to have -optimal solutions.
The assumption of individual upper semicontinuity is of course the main condition on the
payoffs and is heavily used.
We also assumed that the payoffs are Borel measurable. The subgame perfect -equilibria that
we constructed in Theorem 5 are eventually pure in every subgame. Hence, the calculation of the
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expected payoffs for these strategy profiles, or even if a player deviates to a pure strategy, does
not require the payoffs to be Borel measurable. Rather, Borel measurability is needed to be able
to calculate the expected payoffs when a player deviates to a non-pure strategy.
The assumption that the number of players is finite was used to obtain the crucial Corollary 8.
6.3 Payoff functions that are i-lower semicontinuous
It is not known whether all games as defined in Section 2, where each player’s payoff function is
bounded and lower semicontinuous admits an -equilibrium, for every  > 0.6
Nevertheless, using i-convergent sequences we can define the notion of i-lower semicontinuity. A
payoff function ui is i-lower semicontinuous if for every play p and every sequence (pm)m∈N of plays
that is i-convergent to p we have lim inf
m→∞
ui(pm) ≥ ui(p). With this concept, for perfect information
games we can conclude the following statement. Flesch et al. (2010) showed that in every perfect
information game, with arbitrary action spaces, if each player’s payoff function is bounded and
lower semicontinuous then there exists a pure strategy profile such that in any subgame, no player
can gain more than  by unilaterally deviating to another pure strategy. After a careful look at
the proof, the only place where the lower semicontinuity of the payoff functions is used is on page
750 in order to prove that Equation (18) follows from Equation (19). Since the sequence of plays
considered there is not only convergent but also i-convergent, the result of Flesch et al. (2010)
remains valid even if lower semicontinuity is relaxed to i-lower semicontinuity.
6.4 Stochastic transitions
It is a natural question whether or not Theorem 5 can be extended to games with stochastic
transitions. Even if this is possible, the proof would be substantially more complex, as we would
not be able to work with -optimal plays any more.
References
[1] Bruye`re, V. (2017). Computer Aided Synthesis: A Game-Theoretic Approach. In Develop-
ments in Language Theory (pp. 3-35). Springer International Publishing.
[2] Bruye`re, V., Le Roux, S., Pauly, A.,& Raskin, J. F. (2017). On the existence of weak sub-
game perfect equilibria. In International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and
Computation Structures (pp. 145-161). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
[3] Bogachev, V. (2007). Measure Theory. Springer-Verlag.
6It is not even known in the context of quitting games, see for instance Solan and Solan (2017) and the references
therein.
24
[4] Flesch, J., Kuipers, J., Mashiah-Yaakovi, A., Schoenmakers, G., Shmaya, E., Solan, E. &
Vrieze, K. (2014). Non-existence of subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in perfect information
games with infinite horizon. International Journal of Game Theory, 43(4), 945-951.
[5] Flesch, J., Kuipers, J., Mashiah-Yaakovi, A., Schoenmakers, G., Solan, E. & Vrieze, K. (2010).
Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 35(4), 742-755.
[6] Flesch, J., & Predtetchinski, A. (2016). Subgame-perfect ε-equilibria in perfect information
games with common preferences at the limit. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(4),
1208-1221.
[7] Flesch, J., Thuijsman, F., & Vrieze, K. (1997). Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games.
International Journal of Game Theory, 26(3), 303-314.
[8] Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. (1983). Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite horizon
games. Journal of Economic Theory, 31(2), 251-268.
[9] Harris C., Reny P., & Robson, A. (1995). The existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in
continuous games with almost perfect information: a case for public randomization. Econo-
metrica, 63(3), 507-544.
[10] Jas´kiewicz, A., & Nowak, A. (2016). Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Games. In Handbook of Dy-
namic Game Theory (pp. 1-64). Springer International Publishing.
[11] Kechris, A. (1995). Classical Descriptive Set Theory. Springer-Verlag.
[12] Le Roux, S., & Pauly, A. (2016). Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential
games. Preprint: Retrieved from arXiv:1401.3325.
[13] Maitra, A. P., & Sudderth, W. D. (2007). Subgame-perfect equilibria for stochastic games.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 32(3), 711-722.
[14] Mertens, J. F., & Parthasarathy, T. (2003). Equilibria for discounted stochastic games. In:
Stochastic Games and Applications (pp. 131-172). Springer.
[15] Munkres, J. R. (2000). Topology. Prentis Hall.
[16] Prokopovych, P., & Yannelis, N. C. (2017). On strategic complementarities in discontinuous
games with totally ordered strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 70, 147-153.
[17] Purves, R. A. & Sudderth, W. D. (2011). Perfect information games with upper semicontin-
uous payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(3), 468-473.
[18] Secchi, P., & Sudderth, W. D. (2001). N -Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous
payoffs. International Journal of Game Theory, 30(4), 491-502.
25
[19] Solan, E., & Solan, O. (2017). Quitting games and linear complementarity problems. Preprint:
Retrieved from arXiv:1707.02598.
[20] Solan, E., & Vieille, N. (2001). Quitting games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 26(2),
265-285.
26
